Different Chapter, But the Same Jaded Story

A modern day philosopher and entertainer by the name of Bono, said “we thought we had the answers; it was the questions we had wrong.” I was reminded of this aphorism, which I have preached to medical students for half my life, while listening to a program yesterday, 16 August, 2015 on NPR called “On the Media.” In our location in Georgia it comes on at 7:00 AM Sunday morning. This may insure a limited audience, but I try to never miss it. Not because of any political perspective but because the program asks questions about important topics in the news that no one else is asking.

Yesterday, Bob Garfield, one of the hosts of the program, who can, admittedly, be irritating in his provocative manner, asked questions about the new 1,200 page edition of the Department of Defense Law of War Manual, as it pertains to command management of journalists. The person being interviewed was no doubt a lawyer by the name of Charles A. Allen, who is the Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs of the DOD. Mr. Allen spoke with some intellectual condescension about the obvious value of the manual, which is to guide the command structure of the military about “terms of engagement” (my words) in dealing with various individuals or entities in times of conflict. I avoid the term “in times of war” because war seems to have distinct and slippery ambiguity in our country according to the political party in power, or perhaps the words “party not in power” are more accurate. In any case, the manual is not a compendium of laws, of course, but in the hands of the command structure of the United States Army does indeed become law and often determines the course of lives and the manner of death.

The individuals of concern in this manual could be prisoners of war, or as we say today, “unlawful enemy combatants.” Or it could pertain to physicians trying to solve the conflicts of Hippocratic ethics versus the mission demands of the Army. However, in this particular instance the individual/entity of concern is journalists and journalism in general. The DOD legal types have applied the term “unprivileged belligerent” to the potential journalist who is judged by command to have jeopardized operations in any way by either asking the wrong questions, according to command; or writing a story that has not been authorized. Mr. Allen, surprisingly referred to as Chuck by Bob Garfield, says the concern is that a journalist can abandon his position of privilege and become a spy. He indicates the manual is a good way to prevent such an action by a journalist; presumably giving command the authority to take action without due process. Mr. Garfield requested an example of just such an act by a journalist in the last 4 wars of this nation, but Mr. Allen could not provide any narratives of journalistic treason. It seems the manual indicates “a journalist should act only with permission of relevant authorities.” This wording caused Mr. Garfield to express considerable consternation and he noted The New York Times compared such policies as the Law of War Manual to those of “authoritarian regimes.” It makes one wonder if a journalist had asked pertinent questions of General David Petraeus, the father of “The Surge” in Iraq, about his biographer and paramour while he was in command, if the General would have allowed the journalist to keep his credentials.

Bob Garfield was asking very important questions and the DOD, as represented by Mr. Allen, did not provide any rational support for the policy. Freedom of the press, as irritating as journalists can be at times, is one of the most important things our soldiers help protect and preserve.

I would point out to Mr. Garfield that the DOD, or at least the Army, has operated in this fashion, manufacturing policies that become “law” without due process, since at least Vietnam. I cannot speak personally to previous conflicts. This operational prerogative, is where command, particularly generals, can virtually act without due process or any form of precedent. They do it all the time in regard to the medical issues that have prompted this blog to be written.

Significantly, in regard to the medical determinations that occur frequently without due process, it is not just in combat operations that command makes arbitrary judgments, but more commonly occur in the garrison setting within Army bases throughout the United States. These judgments are made without due process and by command officers without any knowledge of medical matters. And without apparent concern for the lives of soldiers who have been serving this country in combat.   The Law of War Manual is akin to the statement from another manual I have noted in previous communications stating line commanders are best equipped to determine the mental health of troops. I will quote the statement by Major General Steve Jones, Commander, US Army Medical Department and School, in the October 2014 edition of the United States Army Medical Department Journal.

“The Army Medical Department plays an important role in building Fitness, resilience and strength, in advising commanders, and serving as a safety net for Soldiers and families. However, the ultimate responsibility remains with the unit commander, as noted in Change 1 to Medical Field Manual 8010, Medical Service of Field Units, dated June 28, 1946: Since the majority of factors which determine mental health of troops fall within the province of Command, the main job of preventive neuropsychiatry must be done by commanding officers of the line.” [View online.]

In response to this fallacious statement I must again ASK MG Jones: in the face of the alarming rate of suicides in soldiers and veterans, the epidemic of PTSD and TBI and the ongoing phenomenal endemic of substance abuse and dependence in the military, how is the command doing with the ultimate responsibility for the mental health of the troops? Different chapter, just the same jaded story. I question the accountability and responsibility of our military leadership. Self-indulgent concern for promotion takes precedence it seems. Napoleon said “There are no bad soldiers, only bad generals.”

For readers interested in the continuing story of the decline of responsible and accountable leadership in the military and in Washington, there are several relatively recent publications:

  • The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today, Thomas Ricks; The Penguin Press, 2012. [View more information online.]
  • The Tragedy of the American Military, James Fallows; The Atlantic, January 2015 (“Why do the best soldiers in the world keep losing?”) [View article online.]
  • The Surge Fallacy, Peter Beinert; The Atlantic, September 2015 (“Having misunderstood the Iraq War U.S. Republicans are taking a dangerously hawkish turn on foreign policy.”)  [View article online.]

Finally, there is an interesting interview available between Bob Garfield for On the Media and Seymour Hersh who published an article in May 2015 in the London Review of Books. The article takes a critical look at the details provided by the U.S. government on the attack and death of Osama Bin Laden. Mr. Hersh has been roundly criticized for his lack of supporting documents and confirmations. However, at least he is asking questions. [Listen to the interview online.]